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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
For some, money is the “root of all evil”, while others have suggested “money is 
power”. What is definitely true is that our economy simply cannot function without it. 
At the centre of our monetary system lies central bank money, because it is what banks 
use to make payments to each other. The collateral framework specifies the rules via 
which central banks inject money into the banking system, so that banks can make 
these payments. Furthermore, as modern financial markets are increasingly organised 
around collateral, central banks’ treatment of collateral – the terms on which they accept 
bonds or loans posted by banks – sends a powerful signal to private financial markets. 
Central banks’ collateral rules have significant knock-on effects for monetary and 
financial conditions in the wider economy. 
The collateral framework of the Eurosystem − the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
euro area national central banks − is at the heart of the ECB’s monetary policy 
implementation. Problematically, the rules dictating this central component to the ECB’s 
monetary policy operations are not fit for purpose.  
In its current form, the collateral framework is not only at odds with democratically 
defined goals of the Paris Agreement and the EU’s Green Deal, but it also actively 
underpins financial market failures and reinforces the carbon lock-in. It further 
contradicts the ECB’s own principles of strong risk standards needed for the sound 
implementation of monetary policy, whilst undermining the high prudential standards 
to which it attempts to hold private financial institutions to account.  
Key findings and recommendations 
We focus on the collateral rules for corporate bonds and show that the Eurosystem 
collateral framework has a carbon bias – it favours fossil fuel companies and other 
carbon-intensive companies disproportionately to their contribution to EU employment 
and the direct production of goods and services. Overall, carbon-intensive companies 
issue 59% of the corporate bonds that the ECB accepts as collateral, while their overall 
contribution to EU employment and Gross Value Added (GVA) is less than 24% and 
29%, respectively. The ECB's collateral framework implicitly encourages fossil fuel 
companies to increasingly tap bond markets − for example, we show that four large 
(mostly gas) fossil fuel companies rely on bonds subsidised by the ECB collateral 
framework for more than half of overall financing. 




Eligibility is not the only way through which the ECB supports carbon-intensive sectors 
− lower haircuts play an important role too. The average haircut in non-carbon intensive 
sectors (13.93%) is demonstrably higher than carbon-intensive sectors, including fossil 
fuel companies (13.33%), energy-intensive companies (11.03%), non-renewable utilities 
(13.36%) and companies that engage in carbon-intensive transportation (10.27%). The 
10 fossil fuel companies with the lowest company-level haircuts, benefit from a haircut 
of between nearly 1% - 4%. These low haircuts effectively signal to financial markets 
that these ‘dirty’ assets carry very low risk, creating favourable financing conditions for 
them.  
To help structurally re-align the ECB monetary policy implementation (and the wider 
financial sector) with the goals of the EU Green Deal and a socially just green transition, 
we propose three policy scenarios that would allow the ECB to green its collateral 
framework. We consider the climate footprint of each bond, and illustrate how our 
scenarios would reduce the weighted average carbon intensity (WACI) of the 
Eurosystem collateral framework from around 243 tCO2e/$m as follows: 
1. The climate-aligned haircuts (more conservative) scenario maintains the existing list of 
eligible bonds, but adjusts the haircuts on collateral – that specify how much banks 
can borrow from the ECB against that collateral − according to the bonds’ climate 
footprint, using a ‘shades of dirty and green’ approach. This approach is specifically 
designed to generate incentives and market signals for firms to issue green bonds 
and improve their climate performance, for example by reducing their emissions. 
This first scenario would see the WACI fall to 235 tCO2e/$m. 
2. The lower-carbon, climate-aligned haircuts scenario excludes dirty bonds issued by 
fossil fuel companies and adds climate-friendly bonds that meet the ECB’s eligibility 
criteria. It also applies climate-aligned haircuts to the adjusted collateral list. This 
scenario would see the WACI fall to 196 tCO2e/$m. 
3. The low-carbon, climate-aligned haircuts scenario no longer allows banks to post 
dirty bonds issued by either fossil fuel companies or other carbon-intensive 
companies as collateral. Rather, it replaces them with other bonds that are not 
carbon-intensive which satisfy the eligibility criteria fully or partly. This third 
scenario would see the WACI fall to 71 tCO2e/$m. 
Our scenarios provide two important insights. First, even an aggressive calibration of 
haircuts to reflect the relative greenness/dirtiness of collateral will not reduce 




significantly the carbon intensity of the ECB’s collateral list. Second, for the ECB to 
seriously tackle the carbon bias hardwired into its collateral rules, it needs to adjust the 
collateral list alongside a climate-aligned haircut framework. The ECB has to rewrite 
eligibility criteria and replace dirty bonds with greener bonds, including those issued by 
carbon-intensive companies. Critically, even our more climate-friendly scenario does 
not eliminate carbon-intensive companies from the list of eligible issuers, but restricts 
the eligibility of their debt in the ECB’s collateral list to green bonds. This encourages 
companies to accelerate the transition to low-carbon activities.  
These scenarios preserve banks’ access to central bank money − the maximum funding 
that banks can obtain from the ECB and the national central banks using corporate 
bonds as collateral remains roughly the same. However, by design, they significantly 
alter the types of bonds banks need to hold to access central bank funding. This 
incentivises banks (and the wider financial sector) to invest in greener rather than 
‘dirtier’ corporate bonds, which in turn incentivises non-financial companies to align 
their practices with the Paris Agreement. 
As we continue to grapple with the greatest health, social and economic shock of our 
lifetime, there is no better time to change the rules so that we come out of this crisis 
better than when we went in. A well-designed financial system is not a silver bullet to fix 
all our economy’s flaws, but it is one of the most important things to get right if we are 
to genuinely build back better. In the absence of reform, the current rules to the 
collateral framework risks ‘locking-in’ and exacerbating large swathes of the financial 
sector’s prevailing weaknesses. 
  




1. INTRODUCTION  
The Eurosystem collateral framework is at the heart of the ECB’s monetary policy 
implementation. It determines how banks in the Eurozone get access to central bank 
money, which is vital for their daily operations and has knock-on effects for broader 
monetary and financial conditions in the economy. However, the existing Eurosystem 
collateral framework is at odds with the Paris Agreement. It favours carbon-intensive 
companies while failing to provide incentives for the decarbonisation that is urgently 
required to avoid a climate catastrophe. It is also a barrier to the EU Green Deal climate 
policies.  
Although there is a growing consensus in the central banking community for the need 
to climate-align the Eurosystem collateral framework, there is no consensus on how this 
should be done. On the one hand, there are views, like those expressed by Bundesbank 
President Jens Weidmann,1 according to which the collateral framework should consider 
climate risks but without violating the ‘market neutrality’ principle – this principle 
suggests that the collateral framework should not distort markets by treating specific 
assets, companies or sectors differently. On the other hand, other Eurosystem policy 
makers recognise that ‘market neutrality’ hardwires a carbon bias into the ECB’s 
monetary policy operations. This requires active interventions to climate-align monetary 
policy instruments. For example, DNB Governor Klaas Knot has recently argued that 
“[c]entral banks can also help to correct the carbon bias in capital markets…[they] could 
explore how, within the boundaries of their mandates, they can redesign their monetary 
policy instruments to prevent such biases from occurring, and instead contribute to 
unlocking more green investments”.2  
In this report, we develop proposals that are in line with an active approach to the 
greening of the Eurosystem collateral framework and move beyond the market 
neutrality principle. The adherence to the market neutrality principle has been criticised 
not only because central banks have in practice engaged in market-shaping 
interventions,3 but more crucially because of the widely recognised failure of markets to 
address the climate crisis. This failure – which has for instance been emphasised by ECB 
Executive Board Member Isabel Schnabel4 – implies that by refusing to ‘distort’ markets 
that are clearly not aligned with the Paris Agreement, central banks reproduce markets’ 
inability to tackle the climate crisis and undermine the collective efforts for the transition 
to a low-carbon economy. An active approach to the greening of the Eurosystem 




collateral framework is also consistent with the recent decision of the Bank of England to 
incorporate the climate impact of bond issuers into the design of its corporate QE 
programme.5  
Our policy proposals rely on the adjustment of haircuts and eligibility criteria to green 
the collateral framework. We use a climate footprint approach that considers the 
‘greenness’ and ‘dirtiness’ of the activities of bond issuers but also company-level 
information about emissions, energy use and decarbonisation plans. We add to the 
growing list of proposals towards decarbonising the ECB’s corporate quantitative easing 
programme6 and the greening of Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations 
(TLTROs)7.8    
The report is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain how collateral frameworks 
work, with specific reference to the importance of eligibility criteria and haircuts. Section 
3 examines how the Eurosystem collateral framework ends up implicitly creating 
favourable financing conditions for fossil fuel companies − through both eligibility 
criteria and haircuts. Section 4 reviews the wider carbon bias in the collateral framework. 
In Section 5, we present our three policy scenarios for greening the Eurosystem 
collateral framework. Section 6 concludes. 
  




2. HOW DOES THE COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK WORK?  
Within the Eurozone monetary architecture, the Eurosystem (i.e. the ECB and the 
national central banks of the euro area) creates money for commercial banks in the form 
of central bank reserves.  Indeed, central bank reserves are also known as base money or 
high-powered money because commercial banks use reserves  in the same way that 
households use deposits. Reserves are electronic records that allow banks to make 
payments to other banks as part of their daily activities, as deposits allow households to 
make payments in their daily life.9  
In the Eurosystem, central banks supply reserves to banks through several channels, 
such as the main refinancing operations (MROs) and the longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs). The MROs provide liquidity to banks on a weekly basis, while the 
LTROs do so on a longer-term basis (e.g. three months).10 These operations ensure the 
smooth function of the banking system.   
Explaining collateral and eligibility  
The Eurosystem only lends central bank money to the banking sector against 
guarantees, a form of insurance, referred to as collateral. To understand the concept of 
‘collateral’, we can use home mortgages as an example. When people receive mortgages, 
banks use the house that will be purchased as an insurance: if borrowers fail to repay 
their mortgage, banks can sell the house to avoid financial losses. Similarly, the ECB and 
the national central banks of the euro area ask for collateral when they lend to banks. 
But instead of accepting houses as a collateral, the ECB and other central banks accept 
financial assets, like government or corporate bonds. The ECB justifies the use of 
collateral on the basis that it protects the Eurosystem from financial losses in case banks 
are unable to pay back the loans they receive.  
The Eurosystem accepts a broad range of financial assets (primarily debt instruments) as 
collateral. These are the so-called ‘eligible assets’. Eligible assets can be marketable 
assets, for example, those assets that can be converted into cash quickly on financial 
markets, like government bonds and corporate bonds. Alternatively, they can be non-
marketable assets, like fixed-term deposits and credit claims, which are more difficult to 
sell or buy since they are not traded on major financial market exchanges. The eligibility 
criteria for these two asset classes include the place of issuance, the currency in which 




the asset is denominated and the credit rating. For marketable assets, the ECB 
announces the list of assets that the Eurosystem accepts as collateral on a daily basis.  
Figure 1 shows the nominal amounts of the eligible marketable assets in the Eurosystem 
over the last two decades or so. Central government securities (government debt issued 
on financial markets) constitute the vast majority of the eligible assets, while corporate 
bonds correspond on average to about 10% of eligible assets. Note that only a 
proportion of these eligible assets has been used by banks in the past for obtaining 
access to central bank liquidity.   
Figure 1: Eligible marketable assets, EUR billion, nominal amounts, averages of end of month data over 
each time period shown 
Source: ECB, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/charts/html/index.en.html 
 
Importantly, the Eurosystem’s eligibility criteria have significant and continuous 
implications for market prices and the allocation of capital, that reverberate throughout 
the financial sector. If banks are short of central bank money needed to clear payments 














































some form of eligible collateral. As a consequence, the assets which are deemed eligible 
as collateral by the Eurosystem unavoidably become more valuable (relative to other 
non-eligible assets) to the banking system. Banks demand these eligible assets to 
directly access credit lines from central banks, or in case they need to access such credit 
in the future.  
Conscious that such eligible assets are critically important to the functioning of the 
banking sector, other investors and creditors will want to hold them, prompting yet 
more demand. The overall increase in demand for these assets can increase their price. 
This means a lower interest rate and borrowing cost for the government or corporate 
that issues the debt instrument.  
Explaining haircuts  
The ECB applies a specific ‘haircut’ to each eligible asset in its collateral framework. A 
haircut establishes the amount of cash that borrowers receive in return for collateral: if 
an asset has a market value of EUR 1 million on the day it is posted as collateral, and the 
haircut assigned to it is 10%, the bank receives a loan of EUR 0.9 million. In this 
example, it effectively means the ECB treats the asset as though it has a value of EUR 0.9 
million, even though it has a market value of EUR 1 million. Thus, the higher the 
haircut, the lower the secured funding that commercial banks can obtain for a given 
asset. In addition to interest rates, haircuts thus constitute an important element of the 
overall cost of funding for banks. 
Haircuts are a risk management tool that are intended to act as a safety cushion for 
central banks. In exchange for lending money to a bank, central banks acquire legal 
ownership of the collateral, which can be sold to recover the money lent should the 
borrower default. Collateral that is traded on the financial markets is, however, subject 
to price fluctuations. The price at which the central bank will be forced to sell the asset 
may be lower than when it was posted as collateral. This would generate a loss for the 
central bank.  
To protect themselves against such potential price falls, central banks tailor their haircut 
regimes to reflect the expected price volatility of eligible collateral. In the example above, 
the 10% haircut is applied because in the event the central bank has to eventually sell 
the asset to recoup its losses it may not be able to sell the asset for EUR 1 million 
(because the bond may fall in price by the time the central bank sells it).   




In the Eurosystem collateral framework, the value of haircuts depends on a number of 
factors, including the credit quality of the bond issuer (i.e. the credit rating), the 
remaining time until the repayment of the bond, and the interest rate paid on the asset 
at regular intervals, which can be fixed, zero, or floating (i.e. subject to periodic changes 
due to market conditions).  
But haircuts are not only important for the relationship between central banks and 
commercial banks. Private financial institutions also lend against collateral and apply 
their own haircuts, and their eligibility criteria and haircut standards are highly 
influenced by those set by the Eurosystem.11 In that sense, the Eurosystem collateral 
framework has wider implications for the functioning of the financial system.   
The literature on shadow banking – by which we mean collateral-based activities 
undertaken by both banks and the lenders, brokers, and other credit intermediaries that 
fall outside the realm of traditional regulated banking – has established that haircuts can 
amplify fluctuations in the financial cycle.12 This is so because financial institutions that 
lend against collateral tend to increase haircuts during bad times, and lower them during 
good times. More substantial haircuts can force private financial actors to deleverage 
(reduce debt levels) via fire sales of securities (the quick sale of assets at heavily 
discounted prices), which dries up collateral market liquidity and pushes haircuts 
higher.13   
This logic also applies to central banks: as monopoly suppliers of reserves via 
collateralised loans, central banks’ decisions to vary haircuts according to credit risk can 
reinforce liquidity spirals14 and significantly influence the underlying price dynamics and 
allocation of capital in the financial sector more widely.  
The collateral framework as a monetary policy 
lever 
The collateral framework, that is, eligible collateral and associated haircuts, is a 
monetary tool independent from interest rate policy and quantitative easing 
programmes. The collateral framework clearly plays an important, if under-researched, 
role in setting the cost of funding for commercial banks and shadow banks, and thus has 
significant implications for the cost and allocation of capital more widely throughout the 
financial sector.  




The few empirical studies available have recently shown that eligible bonds face more 
favourable financing conditions compared to ineligible bonds and that higher haircuts 
are associated with higher bond yields, after controlling for company-level economic 
and financial factors.15 Moreover, a study published by the central bank of a Eurozone 
member – the Banque du France – has shown that firms whose loans are added to the 
ECB’s collateral framework enjoy lower interest rates compared to ineligible ones (after 
controlling for loan, firm and bank-level characteristics). The study also shows that 
newly eligible firms received a higher quantity of credit, when compared to ineligible 
ones.16  
The ECB’s collateral rules affect the financial conditions of carbon-intensive and greener 
companies. This, in turn, impacts on how the former decarbonise their activities, and 
should be used as a test of the ECB’s commitment to green monetary policy operations.  
In this report, we analyse how the ECB should tailor its collateral eligibility and haircuts 
decisions to the climate footprint of corporate bond issuers (i.e. the impact the issuers 
have on the climate crisis through their emissions). We focus on corporate bonds, as it is 
more straightforward to capture their climate footprint compared to debt instruments 
issued by credit institutions and governments.  
To put the importance of the corporate bond market into perspective, one estimate 
suggests that the 2020 nominal value of European investment grade corporate bonds 
(i.e. the corporate debt that has relatively less risk of default) reached approximately 
EUR 5,650bn (which corresponds to about 47% of euro area 2019 GDP).17 Based on our 
estimations, the outstanding amount of the corporate bonds included in the ECB list of 
eligible collateral on 26 November 2020 was about EUR 1,680bn, i.e. 14% of the euro 
area 2019 GDP. The eligible bonds are 4,605 out of 17,094 European investment grade 
corporate bonds (for more details, see Appendix A1).    
  




3. HOW THE ECB’S COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK SUPPORTS FOSSIL FUEL 
COMPANIES 
The ECB includes a significant number of bonds issued by fossil fuel companies in its 
collateral framework. It applies haircuts to those bonds without considering their climate 
footprint or climate risk. By doing so, it creates favourable financing conditions for the 
companies that have the highest responsibility for the climate crisis. As we explained in 
the previous section, the corporates that issue bonds that are deemed eligible in the 
collateral framework receive more credit and can benefit from cheaper borrowing costs 
simply as result of being included in the framework. To the extent that the bonds issued 
by fossil fuel companies are included in the collateral framework, a reasonable 
implication is that the Eurosystem collateral framework is actively creating favourable 
financing conditions – an implicit subsidy – for the companies engaging in the most 
climate damaging activities.  
Identifying fossil fuel companies 
To illustrate the support of the Eurosystem collateral framework to the fossil fuel sector, 
we specify fossil fuel companies in two steps. First, we identify four types of carbon-
intensive activities and specify which issuers of the bonds included in the collateral 
framework have these activities as their primary ones. The carbon-intensive activities are 
as follows:18 
a) Fossil fuel activities, like the extraction of natural gas, the mining of hard coal and 
the manufacture of refined petroleum products;  
b) energy-intensive activities;  
c) activities of non-renewable utilities;  
d) carbon-intensive transportation activities related primarily to car, air and sea 
transportation. 
Although this classification allows us to identify companies whose primary activity is 
related to fossil fuels, it does not permit us to capture companies whose fossil fuel-
related activities are of secondary nature in their production process and further up the 




supply chain. But these companies are still important as they actively engage in fossil 
fuel-related activities.  
Therefore, as a second step, we use the list of fossil fuel companies provided by 
Rainforest Action Network et al. (2020) and Urgewald (2019)19, whereby a broader set of 
criteria that move beyond the primary activities of companies are used (for more details, 
see Appendix A2). The fossil fuel companies analysed in this section should either have 
a fossil fuel primary activity or be included in the Rainforest Action Network et al. (2020) 
or Urgewald (2019) lists.  
Collateral eligibility of fossil fuel companies 
Using this broad definition of fossil fuel companies, we find that 61 fossil fuel companies 
have issued 756 corporate bonds (of about EUR 300bn outstanding amount) that the 
ECB accepted as eligible collateral on 26 November 2020 (the list of companies is 
reported in Appendix A3). For each fossil fuel company we estimate the ratio of eligible 
bonds to their total liabilities (using outstanding amounts). For example, if the eligible 
bonds-to-total liabilities ratio for a company is 50%, this means that 50% of its financing 
comes from  bonds that the ECB accepts as collateral. The higher the ratio, the higher 
the implicit support that the ECB provides to a specific company. Strikingly, for 4 out of 
the 10 fossil fuel companies (mostly gas) with the highest eligible bonds to liabilities 
ratio, rely on bonds subsidised by the Eurosystem collateral framework for more than 
half of overall financing (Figure 2).  
  




Figure 2: The 10 fossil fuel companies with the highest eligible bonds-to-total liabilities ratio (%) 
 
Note: Since the latest available data for total liabilities are for 2019, we have excluded the bonds that are in the 
collateral framework and were issued in 2020. The fossil fuel companies for which the eligible bonds have been 
issued by their financial subsidiaries or their total liabilities were not available through Refinitiv Eikon have been 
excluded from the analysis.   
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv TRBC codes 
and bond outstanding amount, November 2020; company-level total liabilities, 2019) and authors’ calculations. 
Haircuts for fossil fuel companies and supply-
chain effects 
Eligibility is not the only way through which the ECB supports fossil fuel companies: low 
haircuts also play an important role. As Figure 3 illustrates, there are many fossil fuel 
companies whose bonds enjoy very low ECB haircuts. This effectively signals to financial 
markets that assets carry very low risk, creating favourable financing conditions for the 
companies issuing them. Even on the terms of the ECB’s haircut regime, which 
emphasises the exposure of the ECB to the credit risk of collateral issuer, this is 
problematic, as fossil fuel companies are very likely to suffer from climate transition 
risks.  
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Consider the case of SPP Distribucia as. According to the latest data available, over 30% 
of its outstanding financing came from issuing ECB eligible corporate bonds (see Figure 
2). Furthermore, the ECB applied very low haircuts to those bonds, further easing 
financing conditions for the fossil fuel company.  
Figure 3: The 10 fossil fuel companies with the lowest company-level haircuts (%) on their eligible bonds.  
 
Note: The company-level haircuts are estimated as the average haircut of all the eligible bonds of each company, 
weighted by the outstanding amount of each eligible bond.   
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit, Refinitiv TRBC 
codes and bond outstanding amount, November 2020) and authors’ calculations. 
 
In evaluating the support that the ECB provides to fossil fuel companies we also need to 
consider supply chain effects. When the ECB includes fossil fuel companies’ bonds in its 
collateral framework, it not only implicitly supports the financing of these companies; it 
also provides indirect support to those fossil fuel companies that supply inputs to 
eligible bond issuers.  
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Table 1: The 5 fossil-fuel eligible bond issuers with the highest number of fossil-fuel suppliers 
Fossil-fuel company name  Number of fossil-fuel suppliers 
Equinor ASA 40 
Eni SpA 28 
Total SE 11 
Repsol SA 6 
TechnipFMC PLC 5 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv TRBC codes 
and suppliers, November 2020) and authors’ calculations 
 
Table 1 shows that Equinor ASA, Eni SpA and Total SE together have roughly 80 fossil 
fuel suppliers. Although the bonds of these suppliers are not necessarily included in the 
list of eligible bonds, the fact that customers of these fossil fuel suppliers have issued 

















4. THE WIDER CARBON BIAS IN THE 
EUROSYSTEM COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Eligibility and carbon intensive companies 
Besides fossil fuel companies, the Eurosystem collateral framework also supports other 
carbon-intensive companies, both via the eligibility criteria and haircuts. In Table 2, we 
show that three sectors account for 68.4% of EU-28 GHG emissions − ‘Manufacturing’, 
‘Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply’ and ‘Transportation and storage’. 
These sectors are clearly disproportionately represented in the list of eligible bonds 
when their contribution to EU-28 employment and GVA is taken into account. 
Collectively they contribute only 20.7% toward employment and 24.4% to GVA, but 
account for 61.8% of the outstanding amount (in EUR) in the ECB list. 
 
Table 2: Sectoral breakdown of the ECB list of eligible corporate bonds in the collateral framework 
(outstanding amount), EU-28 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, EU-28 employment and EU-28 Gross 




ECB list of 












to EU-28 GVA 
(%) 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.05 15.06 4.56 1.62 
B Mining and quarrying 1.41 2.25 0.26 0.45 
C Manufacturing 38.81 24.96 14.65 17.29 
D 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
14.50 28.56 0.56 1.91 
E 
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities 
1.94 4.93 0.80 1.05 
F Construction 3.34 1.92 6.82 5.73 
G 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
2.22 2.91 15.32 12.07 
H Transportation and storage 8.52 14.91 5.49 5.19 
I 
Accommodation and food 
service activities 
0.47 0.56 5.62 2.97 
J Information and communication 10.27 0.25 3.25 5.70 




K Financial and insurance activities 7.53 0.18 2.61 5.42 
L Real estate activities 6.86 0.20 1.18 11.79 
M 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 
1.12 0.61 6.77 7.36 
N 
Administrative and support 
service activities 
2.19 0.65 7.20 4.99 
P Education 0.13 0.50 7.24 5.20 
Q 
Human health and social work 
activities 
0.53 0.95 11.28 7.77 
R 
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
0.00 0.25 1.92 1.43 
S Other service activities 0.09 0.34 2.86 1.70 
T 
Activities of households as 
employers; undifferentiated 
goods- and services-producing 
activities of households for own 
use 
0.00 0.01 1.61 0.38 
Total   100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Note: The table does not include the sector ‘O – Public administration and defense; compulsory social security’ 
since bonds issued by this sector are not included in the list of eligible corporate bonds analysed in this report (see 
Appendix A1).  
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 1-digit codes and bond outstanding 
amount, November 2020), Eurostat (employment, GVA and GHG emissions, 2018) and authors’ calculations.  
 
Figure 4 offers a more granular analysis that relies on the carbon-intensive activities 
described in Section 3. Overall, carbon-intensive companies represent 59% of the 
outstanding amount of the eligible corporate bonds, while their overall contribution to 
the EU employment and GVA is less than 24% and 29%, respectively. This suggests that 
the sectoral allocation underlying the eligibility of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework 
does not mirror the sectoral make-up of the euro area when it comes to employment 
and GVA, and is considerably biased towards carbon intensive sectors. These results are 
broadly in line with those obtained in sectoral decomposition analyses of the ECB 
corporate QE programme.20 
  




Figure 4: Contribution of carbon-intensive sectors to the ECB list of eligible corporate bonds in the 
collateral framework (outstanding amount), EU-28 employment and EU-28 Gross Value Added (GVA) 
Employment 
 
Gross Value Added (GVA) 
 
 
Note: In the case of non-renewable utilities and carbon-intensive transportation, bonds issued by companies that 
engage in green activities based on their TRBC codes (see Appendix A5) are not included in the carbon-intensive 
eligible bonds.   
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv TRBC codes 
and bond outstanding amount, November 2020), Eurostat, Annual detailed enterprise statistics for industry 
(employment and GVA, 2018) and authors’ calculations. 
Haircuts and carbon intensive companies 
It is well known that carbon-intensive companies are on average more exposed to 
transition risks; that is, the climate-related financial risks that arise from the processes of 
mitigation and adjustment towards a lower-carbon economy. However, the credit 
agencies that determine the ratings of bonds have not so far adequately accounted for 
these climate risks in their assessments.21 Since the ECB uses the ratings of credit 
agencies to evaluate the credit quality of bonds, it clearly underestimates the risks of 
bonds issued by carbon-intensive sectors.22  
This has significant implications for the haircuts of carbon-intensive companies given 
that the assessment of credit quality is the most important driver of the bond haircuts in 
the collateral framework. By failing to take into account climate transition risks, the ECB 
haircuts for carbon-intensive companies are on average lower than what they should 
actually be. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the average haircuts of fossil fuel companies, 
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energy-intensive companies, non-renewable utilities and companies that engage in 
carbon-intensive transportation are 13.33%, 11.03%, 13.36% and 10.27%, respectively − 
all lower than the average haircut of non-carbon intensive companies (which is 
13.93%).23  
Figure 5: Average company-level haircut (%) of eligible bonds issued by carbon-intensive sectors, non-
carbon-intensive sectors and all sectors 
 
Note: The company-level haircuts are estimated as the average haircut of all the eligible bonds of each company, 
weighted by the outstanding amount of each eligible bond.   
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv 
TRBC codes and bond outstanding amount, November 2020) and authors’ calculations 
 
The consideration of climate transition risks would most likely make the haircuts of 
these companies higher than the haircuts of the rest of the companies in the collateral 
framework. The same would also be the case if the collateral framework would be used 
as a means to support the transition to a low-carbon economy, as we show in the next 
section.   
In sum, the Eurosystem collateral framework favours carbon-intensive companies both 
through the carbon bias in the list of eligible bonds and the non-consideration of climate 
issues in the determination of haircuts. The empirical analyses mentioned in Section 2 
suggest that this favourable treatment of carbon-intensive companies results in better 
financing conditions for polluting companies compared to less polluting ones.    
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5. HOW TO GREEN THE COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK: THREE SCENARIOS 
We consider three policy scenarios for the greening of the Eurosystem collateral 
framework. In all these scenarios we consider the climate footprint of each bond which 
is specified based on the following factors:  
(1) whether the bond has been issued by a company whose primary activity is 
carbon-intensive;  
(2) whether it has a ‘green bond’ label;24  
(3) whether it has been issued by a company that engages in a (potentially) green 
activity;  
(4) the level of carbon intensity of the bond issuer compared to the intensity of 
the sector that the issuer belongs to; 
(5) the share of non-renewable energy in the total energy use of the bond issuer 
compared to its peers; 
(6) the decarbonisation that the bond issuer has achieved over the last years 
compared to its peers; and  
(7) how aligned the decarbonisation plans of the bond issuer are with scenarios 
that are consistent with the Paris Agreement.  
Factors (1), (2) and (3) allow us to implement an activity/project-based distinction of 
bonds between ‘carbon-intensive’, ‘green’ and ‘other’, while factors (4), (5), (6) and (7) 
are used to construct our Company Climate Index (CCI) which allows us to implement a 
granular ‘shades of dirty and green’ perspective. All the details and formulas through 
which we identify the climate footprint of companies are described in Appendix A5.  
Scenario 1 − Climate-aligned haircuts 
In the first scenario – climate-aligned haircuts – we keep the list of eligible bonds 
unchanged but adjust haircuts based on their climate footprint. In particular, we increase 
the haircuts of carbon-intensive issuers. This increase is, however, lower for companies 
with a better climate performance, creating a clear incentive for companies to become 
more climate-aligned. Similarly, we lower haircuts on ‘green bonds’ and bonds issued 




by companies that engage in (potentially) green activities so that the reduction in 
haircuts is higher for the bond issuers that have a better climate performance. For the 
rest of the bonds, the haircuts increase or decrease depending solely on the company-
level climate performance. The formula that we use for the adjustment in haircuts is 
presented in Appendix A6.25  
As shown in Figure 6, the climate-aligned haircuts are, on average, higher than the ECB 
ones for bonds issued by carbon-intensive companies and lower for bonds issued by 
companies that engage in (potentially) green activities, as well as for ‘green bonds’. For 
the remaining bonds, climate-aligned haircuts are slightly higher.26    
 
Figure 6: Average bond haircut, ECB list of eligible bonds with and without climate-aligned haircuts 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv 
TRBC codes, bond outstanding amount, November 2020; environmental variables) and authors’ calculations. 
 
However, within each set of activities there is high heterogeneity in the level of haircuts. 
We illustrate that in Figure 7, where we report the distribution in the bond haircuts for 
energy-intensive companies. On the one hand, ‘green bonds’ issued by these companies 
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enjoy a decline in haircuts; on the other hand, bonds issued by companies that have a 
very poor climate performance exhibit an increase in haircuts that is close to 80%. 
Carbon-intensive companies that perform relatively well in the CCI experience only a 
mild increase in the haircuts of their bonds. This suggests that our climate-aligned 
haircuts can incentivise companies in carbon-intensive sectors to reduce their adverse 
climate impact.       
Figure 7: Percentage change (%) in the haircuts of eligible bonds issued by energy-intensive companies  
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv 
TRBC codes, bond outstanding amount, November 2020; environmental variables) and authors’ calculations 
 
By changing the haircuts applied to corporate bonds, the maximum funding that banks 
can obtain from the ECB also changes, which could have important implications for the 
stability of the banking sector. To proxy how the maximum level of funding changes, we 
compare in Figure 8 the existing haircut-adjusted outstanding amount of bonds (first 
bar) and the climate-aligned one (second bar).27 The haircut-adjusted amount declines 
only slightly when our proposed haircuts are imposed, suggesting that our climate-
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banks.28 Moreover, the ECB would adjust haircuts without modifying the current bond 
eligibility criteria. 
Figure 8: Haircut-adjusted outstanding amount of eligible corporate bonds (in EUR billion) and weighted 
average carbon intensity (WACI) (in tCO2e/$m), existing ECB list and low-carbon scenarios  
 
Note: The figures above each bar show the WACI for each scenario. 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv 
TRBC codes, bond outstanding amount, November 2020; financial and environmental variables) and authors’ 
calculations 
 
Overall, from a climate perspective, our ‘climate-aligned haircuts’ scenario differs from 
the existing collateral framework in two key ways. Firstly, although collateral eligibility 
does not change, within each type of activity those companies with better climate 
performance face lower haircuts compared to their peers with poorer climate 
performance. Secondly, the weighted average carbon intensity (WACI) in this scenario 
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Scenario 2 − Lower-carbon, climate-aligned 
haircuts  
To support the low-carbon transition, a more effective approach would be to exclude all 
the dirty bonds issued by fossil fuel companies while adding other green bonds and 
bonds issued by (potentially) green sectors, which satisfy the eligibility criteria (third bar 
in Figure 8). In this second scenario, climate-aligned haircuts are used again.30 It is also 
important to note that whilst our framework does preclude dirty bonds issued by fossil 
fuel companies, it gives the opportunity to these companies to remain eligible by issuing 
green bonds whose haircuts are adjusted accordingly.  
Figure 8 shows that in our ‘lower-carbon list’ scenario, the haircut-adjusted outstanding 
amount of bonds would increase and the WACI of the list of eligible bonds would 
decline substantially. Moreover, the activity decomposition of the eligible bonds would 
change compared to the existing collateral framework.  
Scenario 3 − Low-carbon, climate-aligned haircuts  
In our last scenario (fourth bar in Figure 8), we exclude the bonds of all companies that 
engage in carbon-intensive activities (apart from green bonds) and we replace them 
with (i) green bonds and bonds issued by companies that engage in (potentially) green 
activites that satisfy all the eligibility criteria apart from the investment grade one and (ii) 
bonds of companies that engage in ‘other’ activities (i.e. activities that are neither green 
or dirty) which satisfy the eligibility criteria fully or partly.  
The relaxation of the investment grade criterion allows us to avoid a decline in the 
haircut-adjusted outstanding amount. Although this relaxation might be seen as a 
limitation of this scenario from a traditional risk management perspective, a key 
advantage of this scenario is that it generates a very substantial decline in the WACI to 
71 tCO2e/$m. Note also that all the non-investment grade bonds that are added have 
been assigned very high haircuts.  
Overall, our proposed low-carbon collateral framework does not reduce the maximum 
collateralised liquidity that banks can obtain through the Eurosystem. It changes, 
however, the types of bonds that banks need to hold in order to preserve their access to 
central bank liquidity. Under our scenarios, banks with ‘dirtier’ corporate bond 
portfolios would need to shift to ‘greener’ bonds and climate practices to ensure smooth 
access to central bank loans. Given the permanent nature of the Eurosystem collateral 




framework, and its signalling role for the secured funding markets, the implementation 
of our proposals could contribute to the decarbonisation of the European corporates.   
  





The Eurosystem collateral framework is at the heart of the euro area financial system. Its 
current form favours bonds issued by carbon-intensive sectors, so it acts as a barrier to 
the decarbonisation of the EU economy. In this report, we have shown how the 
collateral framework could become climate-aligned, incentivising companies to 
decarbonise their production. 
We have specified three policy scenarios for the greening of the collateral framework. In 
the first scenario, the list of eligible bonds remains the same, but the haircuts of the 
bonds are adjusted according to their climate footprint. Our climate-aligned haircuts 
have been designed to induce firms to issue green bonds, reduce their carbon intensity, 
increase the share of renewable energy use and set targets for absolute reductions in 
emissions. In the second scenario, we exclude fossil fuel companies’ bonds from the list 
of eligible bonds (except for those that have a ‘green’ label) and add other bonds with 
relatively low climate footprints. In the third scenario, we exclude bonds issued by fossil 
fuel companies but also the bonds that are issued by the other carbon-intensive 
companies. We replace them with other bonds that are not carbon-intensive and satisfy 
fully or partly the eligibility criteria. In all of these scenarios, the weighted average 
carbon intensity of the eligible bond list declines. The higher decline in the second and 
third scenarios suggests that these scenarios are more consistent with tackling the 
climate emergency.   
Oustry et al. (2020)31 have recently suggested that the Eurosystem collateral framework 
could address climate risks by encouraging banks to pledge more climate-aligned assets 
as collateral, without modifying the list of eligible bonds or their haircuts. They argue 
that this approach would allow the Eurosystem to factor climate risks into its collateral 
framework without violating the market neutrality principle.  
Although the implementation of their proposal would definitely contribute to the 
decarbonisation of the euro area financial system, we think it does not go far enough. 
The urgency of the climate crisis calls for the ECB and the other euro area central banks 
to discard the obsolete market neutrality principle, and put in place more active 
interventions. The ECB needs to pick up the challenge of greening the collateral 
framework through direct changes in haircuts and the list of eligible bonds, as we have 
recommended in this report. Leaving this issue to the market would only postpone the 




crucial support that the Eurosystem should provide to governments’ decarbonisation 
plans.   
  





A1. THE ECB LIST OF ELIGIBLE CORPORATE BONDS 
The marketable assets included in the Eurosystem collateral framework should satisfy 
the following criteria:32 
1) they should have been issued either (a) in euros by an institution established in the 
European Economic Area (EEA), Canada, Japan, the UK or the US, or (b) in USD, 
yen or sterling by an institution established in the EEA; 
2) they should be rated investment grade.33  
In our analysis, the ECB list of eligible corporate bonds comprises all those bonds that 
are included in the list of bonds accepted as collateral in the Eurosystem whose: (i) 
issuer group is IG3 (‘corporate and other issuers’), IG9 (‘financial corporations other 
than credit institutions’) or IG11 (‘public corporation’) and (ii) asset type is AT01 
(‘bond’), AT02 (‘Medium-term note’), and AT03 (‘Treasury) bill / commercial paper / 
certificate of deposit’). We exclude those bonds whose issuer belongs to the NACE 2-
digit sector 84 (‘public administration and defense; compulsory social security’). The 
data refer to 26 November 2020 and have been downloaded from the ECB website.34 
The number and outstanding amount of the bonds included in the ECB list of eligible 
bonds is 4,605 and EUR 1,680bn, respectively.35 As explained in Appendix A5, our 
analysis requires the identification of the 4-digit NACE code and the Refinitiv Thomson 
Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) code of the bond issuer as well as the 
outstanding amount for each bond. For some bonds, the outstanding amount is not 
available from Refinitiv Eikon. Therefore, we exclude these bonds as well as those bonds 
for which the NACE or TRBC code is not available in Refinitiv Eikon. The ultimate 
number of bonds in the ECB list of eligible bonds analysed in this report is 4,099 (with 
an outstanding amount of EUR 1,620bn). The match between the bonds and the 
companies that have issued them is made by using the International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN).  
  




A2. FOSSIL FUEL COMPANIES IN URGEWALD (2019) AND RAINFOREST 
ACTION NETWORK ET AL. (2020)   
Urgewald (2019) provides a list of coal companies, called the Global Coal Exit List 
(GCEL). For a company to be included in GCEL, it should satisfy at least one of the 
following three criteria:  
1. it should belong to the mining, power, services or utility sector, and its coal-related 
power production or revenue should be at least 20% of its total production or revenue; 
2. its annual thermal coal production should exceed or equal 10 million tonnes or its 
installed coal-fired power capacity generation should exceed or equal 5 GW;  
3. it should have coal power, coal mining or coal infrastructure expansion plans. 
Rainforest Action Network et al. (2020) identifies the following categories of top fossil 
fuel companies: 
1. Fossil fuel expansion companies (they include GCEL companies) 
2. Tar sand companies  
3. Arctic oil and gas companies 
4. Offshore oil and gas companies 
5. Fracked oil and gas companies  
6. Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) companies  











A3. FOSSIL FUEL COMPANIES: SHARE OF ELIGIBLE BONDS AND 







2I Rete Gas SpA - 14.02 
A2A SpA 32.97 12.62 
Apetra NV - 1.26 
BP PLC - 12.78 
CDP Reti SpA - 18.00 
Centrica PLC 0.75 27.31 
CEZ as 20.46 2.92 
Corporacion de Reservas Estrategicas de Productos Petroliferos - 2.60 
E.ON SE 7.25 14.74 
Enagas SA - 3.51 
EnBW Energie Baden Wuerttemberg AG - 34.26 
Endesa SA - 0.80 
Enel SpA 1.22 10.75 
Engie SA 14.34 21.27 
Eni SpA 14.42 6.17 
EP Infrastructure as - 13.91 
Equinor ASA 12.44 7.16 
Erdoel lager GmbH - 5.51 
Erdoelbevorratungsverband KdoeR - 4.80 
Eustream as - 3.60 
EVN AG 10.92 4.01 
Fluvius System Operator CVBA 73.97 3.01 
Fluxys Belgium NV 31.75 4.80 
Fluxys SA - 7.12 
Gas Networks Ireland - 3.70 
Glencore PLC - 24.80 
Hera SpA 30.17 13.59 
Iberdrola SA - 7.53 
Iren SpA 39.00 13.29 
Italgas SpA 50.21 14.27 
L'Air Liquide Societe Anonyme pour l'Etude et l'Exploitation des 
Procedes Georges Claude SA 
1.21 28.87 
LafargeHolcim Ltd - 23.96 




Linde PLC - 11.86 
LyondellBasell Industries NV - 24.80 
MOL Magyar Olajes Gazipari Nyrt 8.32 9.60 
National Grid Gas PLC 3.38 22.00 
Naturgy Energy Group SA - 20.89 
Nederlandse Gasunie NV 61.19 3.30 
Net4Gas sro - 6.40 
NK Lukoil PAO - 31.10 
Northern Gas Networks Holdings Ltd - 36.95 
OMV AG 19.37 3.55 
Petrol dd Ljubljana 3.02 13.20 
Polski Koncern Naftowy Orlen SA - 16.79 
Quadgas Holdings Topco Ltd - 25.45 
RAG Stiftung - 18.93 
Repsol SA - 17.84 
Rio Tinto PLC - 19.51 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC - 12.95 
Schlumberger NV - 13.18 
Scotland Gas Networks PLC - 25.78 
Snam SpA 40.93 11.20 
Societa Metropolitana Acque Torino SpA - 13.20 
Southern Gas Networks PLC 42.91 25.44 
SPP Distribucia as 31.76 0.80 
Tauron Polska Energia SA 8.96 14.80 
TechnipFMC PLC 3.89 9.90 
Terega SA 56.04 11.65 
Total SE - 5.65 
Veolia Environnement SA 23.63 12.47 
Vier Gas Transport GmbH - 3.80 
 
Note: Since the latest available data for total liabilities are for 2019, we have excluded the bonds that are in the collateral 
framework and were issued in 2020. The fossil fuel companies for which the eligible bonds have been issued by their financial 
subsidiaries or their total liabilities were not available through Refinitiv Eikon have been excluded from the analysis of the 
eligible bonds-to-assets ratio. The company-level haircuts are estimated as the average haircut of all the eligible bonds of each 
company, weighted by the outstanding amount of each eligible bond.   
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv TRBC codes, 
bond outstanding amount, November 2020; company-level total liabilities, 2019) and authors’ calculations. 
  




A4. AVERAGE HAIRCUT OF ELIGIBLE BONDS PER CARBON-INTENSIVE 
SECTOR 
 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 4-digit codes, Refinitiv 
TRBC codes, November 2020) and authors’ calculations.  
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A5. IDENTIFYING THE CLIMATE FOOTPRINT OF BONDS 
We identify the climate footprint of each bond taking into account the following factors:  
1. Whether the principal activity of the bond issuer is classified as carbon-intensive 
based on the NACE 4-digit codes and Refinitiv TRBC codes: We identify carbon-
intensive activities drawing on Battiston and Monasterolo (2019)36. The starting point 
is the Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS) classification, presented in Battiston et 
al. (2017)37. This classification specifies sectors that can be affected by climate policies 
and are subject to climate transition risks. However, not all of these sectors are 
necessarily carbon-intensive. Battiston and Monasterolo (2019) have identified 
carbon-intensive sectors, which are a subset of CPRS. We have identified NACE 4-
digit codes that correspond to carbon-intensive activities following the rationale of 
their classification. However, those companies that belong to these NACE 4-digit 
codes, but their Refinitiv Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) activity or 
industry is related to green activities, are not included in our carbon-intensive list. 
The list of green activities is reported below (see 2). We end up with bonds issuers 
that engage in the following carbon-intensive activities: (i) fossil fuel activities; (ii) 
energy-intensive activities; (iii) activities of non-renewable utilities and (iv) carbon-
intensive transportation activities.  
2. Whether the NACE 4-digit code of the bond issuer corresponds to potentially green 
activities or the Refinitiv TRBC code corresponds to green activities: We use the 
recently developed EU Taxonomy of sustainable activities38 to specify what we call 
‘potentially green’ activities. The EU Taxonomy identifies NACE 4-digit codes that 
capture activities that can contribute to climate mitigation because they (i) are 
already low-carbon, (ii) are not low-carbon but can contribute to the transition to a 
low-carbon economy by reducing emissions (transition activities), and/or (iii) enable 
other activities to achieve emissions reductions (enabling activities). A limitation of 
the EU classification is that it includes many carbon-intensive activities. These are 
primarily the transition activities undertaken by high-carbon companies. 
Although we acknowledge the need for promoting activities that reduce 
emissions in carbon-intensive sectors, we find it misleading to call these activities 
‘green’. It would be more accurate to argue that these are ‘dirty’ activities, whose 
degree of dirtiness can decline. Thus, in our ‘potentially green’ sectors we include 
all these NACE codes that are part of the EU Taxonomy for climate mitigation 




but are not carbon-intensive. We, however, make some exceptions, for example 
in the case of real estate activities and life insurance. Although these activities are 
included in the EU taxonomy and are not carbon-intensive, we think it is not 
accurate enough to call them ‘potentially green’, since their contribution to 
emission reduction is likely to be very small. We overall identify companies that 
engage in the following activities: ‘potentially green forestry’, ‘potentially green 
waste management and remediation’, ‘potentially green construction’, ‘potentially 
green transportation’, ‘potentially green information and communication’. The 
reason why these activities are called ‘potentially green’ is that we do not have 
sufficient information to decide if the activities conducted by these sectors are 
actually green. The EU Taxonomy has specified screening criteria that include 
thresholds for metrics related, for example, to emission and energy generation. 
However, we do not have access to such detailed information at a sufficiently 
granular level for all companies that are included in our analysis.  
On top of the ‘potentially green’ activities, we identify some additional green 
activities taking into account the TRBC activity or industry of the companies. These 
are (i) ‘renewable utilities’ (which comprise the TRBC activities ‘renewable utilities’, 
‘renewable independent power producers (IPPs)’, ‘power charging stations’, 
‘alternative electric utilities’, ‘hydroelectric and tidal utilities’, ‘solar electric utilities’, 
‘wind electric utilities’, ‘biomass and waste to energy electric utilities’ and 
‘geothermal electric utilities’), (ii) ‘renewable fuels’, (iii) ‘renewable energy 
equipment and services’ and (iv) ‘environmental services and equipment’. We also 
include the TRBC activity ‘electric (alternative) vehicles’ in the ‘potentially green 
transportation’ category mentioned above. 
3. Whether the bond is classified as green: We use the green bond flag provided by 
Refinitiv Eikon. Refinitiv Eikon defines green bonds as fixed income products that 
offer investors the opportunity to participate in the financing of large sustainable 
energy green projects that help mitigate climate change and help countries adapt to 
the effects of climate change.  
4. The Relative Carbon Intensity (RCI) of the issuer: This relies on the company-level 
carbon intensity provided by Refinitiv Eikon, which is equal to the sum of Scope 1 
and Scope 2 CO2 equivalent GHG emissions (in tonnes) over the company revenues 




in $ million.39 When reported data is missing, we use the estimated intensity from 
Refinitiv Eikon, if this is provided. The data that we use refers to 2019. The RCI of 
each company is given by:   
 
where  is the company-level carbon intensity and  is the median 
carbon intensity in the TRBC business sector that the company belongs to (based on 
the available Refinitiv Eikon data for the companies of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), Canada, Japan, the UK and the US). The higher the RCI the worse the climate 
performance of the company. We set an upper limit for the ratio (UPPER) such that 
we prevent it from taking very high values. If Refinitiv Eikon does not provide any 
data for the carbon intensity (reported or estimated), we set the RCI equal to 1.       
5. The Relative Non-Renewable Share (RNRS) of the issuer: This relies on the 
company-level renewable energy use ratio provided by Refinitiv Eikon, which is 
defined as the total energy purchased from primary renewable energy sources over 
company’s total energy use. The data that we use refers to 2019. We define the non-
renewable share as 1 minus the renewable energy use ratio. The RNRS of each 
company is given by: 
 
where  is the company-level non-renewable share and  is the 
median non-renewable share in the TRBC business sector that the company belongs 
to. The higher the RNRS the worse the climate performance of the company. We set 
an upper limit for the ratio (UPPER) such that we prevent it from taking very high 
values. If Refinitiv Eikon does not provide data for the renewable energy use ratio, 
we set RNRS equal to 1.      
6. The Relative Backward-looking Decarbonisation Rate (RBDR) of the issuer: This is 
based on the percentage change in Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions of the bond issuer 
over the period 2017-2019 provided by Refinitiv Eikon. We define the decarbonation 
























 if ; otherwise  
where  is the company-level decarbonisation rate and  is either 
(i) the median decarbonisation rate in the TRBC business sector that the company 
belongs to (if this median is positive), or (ii) the mean of the median decarbonisation 
rates in the TRBS business sectors with positive median decarbonisation rates (if this 
median is negative). The higher the RBDR the worse the climate performance of the 
company. We set an upper limit for the ratio (UPPER) such that we prevent it from 
taking very high values. If , we set  to capture the fact 
that the company performance is completely at odds with the climate emergency 
since its emissions have not declined over the last years. If Refinitiv Eikon does not 
provide data for the growth rate of emissions, we set RBDR equal to 1.       
7. The Relative Forward-looking Decarbonisation Rate (RFDR) of the issuer: Refinitiv 
Eikon provides data about the target emission reduction percentage until a specific 
future year (the year differs between companies). We define the target 
decarbonisation rate as the annual compound targeted percentage reduction in 
emissions. The RFDR is given by: 
 
where  is the target decarbonisation rate of the company and  
is the decarbonisation rate that is required in order for the company to be aligned 
with a specific climate scenario. In this report we set  equal to 7% which, 
according to the EU Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (2019)40 is 
broadly in line with IPCC’s 1.5oC scenario. If Refinitiv Eikon does not provide data 
for the target decarbonisation rate of a company, we interpret this as a lack of 
decarbonisation plans and we thus penalise the company by setting RFDR equal to 
UPPER.             
Based on factors (1), (2) and (3), we identify the following activity/project-based 
dummy variables for each bond j: 
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(ii) the variable  which equals 1 if the bond issuer’s primary activity is 
‘potentially green’ or the bond has a ‘green’ label;  
(iii) the variable  which equals 1 when both  and  are equal to 0.  
Using factors (4), (5), (6) and (7), we define the following Company Climate Index 
(CCI) for each issuer of bond j: 
 
where  is the relative carbon intensity of the issuer of bond j,  is the 
relative non-renewable share,  is the relative backward-looking 
decarbonisation rate of and  is the relative forward-looking decarbonisation 
rate.  and  are the weights that are applied to each component of the CCI. 
In the estimations of this report we have used  and . We have 
also used UPPER=2, which means that the CCI takes values between 0 and 2. The 
higher the CCI the worse the climate performance of a company.   
Note that a large number of corporate bonds are issued by companies that engage in 
financial service and insurance activities (sectors K.64, K.65 and K.66). Following 
Battiston and Monasterolo (2019), for the bonds that have been issued by these 
companies, we use the NACE codes, the TRBC industry/activity and the company-
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A6. ESTIMATING CLIMATE-ALIGNED HAIRCUTS 
The climate-aligned haircut of each bond j ( ) is given by the following formula 
which combines that activity/project-based dummy variables and the Company Climate 
Index (CCI) defined in Appendix A5: 
 
where  is the current haircut in the Eurosystem collateral framework and ,  
and  parameters capturing the adjustment of the haircut for carbon-intensive, 
‘potentially green’ sectors/green bonds and other sectors. In the estimations for this 
report we have used . Recall that a higher  reflects a poorer climate 
performance.  
For the conventional bonds of carbon-intensive issuers, the haircut increases by 
 if  while for companies that engage in (potentially) green activities or 
issue green bonds the haircut declines by  if . For the rest of the bonds, 
the haircuts remain unchanged if . The formula has the following implications. 
First, the conventional bonds that are issued by carbon-intensive companies experience 
a lower penalty the better is the climate performance of the issuers. Second, carbon-
intensive companies can avoid a penalty by issuing green bonds. Third, green bonds and 
bonds issued by companies engaging in (potentially) green activities experience a lower 
decline in their haircut the higher is their carbon footprint. 
Overall, the formula takes into account that companies that engage in carbon-intensive 
activities have a higher responsibility for the climate crisis, but at the same time it 
provides the opportunity to these companies to experience lower haircuts by improving 
their climate performance or by issuing green bonds. Moreover, for the (potentially) 
green companies there is an incentive to improve their climate performance since this 
would allow them to experience an even higher decline in the haircuts of the bonds that 
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A7. AVERAGE BOND HAIRCUT PER NACE 1-DIGIT SECTOR, ECB LIST OF 




Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 1-digit and 4-digit 
codes, Refinitiv TRBC codes, November 2020; environmental variables) and authors’ calculations 
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A8. CHANGE IN THE HAIRCUT-ADJUSTED OUTSTANDING AMOUNT OF 
ELIGIBLE BONDS PER NACE 1-DIGIT SECTOR  
 
Note: The figure shows the difference between the outstanding amount in the ‘ECB list’ and the outstanding 
amount it the ‘ECB list, climate-aligned haircuts’ 
Sources: ECB (bond ISIN codes and haircuts, 26 November 2020), Refinitiv Eikon (NACE 1-digit and 4-digit 
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